Note: Some of these principles are still applicable in struggles…we give below some excerpts.CS.
THE GREATEST WAR ILLUSIONS – Richard Stokes
"Masters of wizardry and illusion, they hid the
According to Fisher, in June 1941 Barkas had yet another 'mission impossible' for the Magic Gang. The vital Mediterranean
Could he give a new twist to conceptualising war as 'la grande illusion'?
The first proposed solution was to cover the ships and port facilities under huge canvas sheets, but this would be an enormous undertaking. This method might be feasible for disguising small coves, such as those around Tobruk, but
The second idea was to construct a massive optical illusion based on gigantic mirrors, but this was rejected as impractical. Even if such an illusion were feasible, stray bombs would shatter the glass contraption.
Fisher attributes the following words to Maskelyne: “We can't cover it up. We can't disguise it. And we can't hide it. There's only one solution left to us, isn't there? ...We've got toConsequently, Maskelyne and his crew began creating a replica seaport located at ‘
Fisher's description continues: "Using night reconnaissance photographs as their blueprint, the Engineers replicated the ground-light pattern of
Because enemy bombers would expect some reaction from genuine ground targets, real anti-aircraft guns were supplied and made operational. Remote control explosives were installed in several of the fake wooden structures. An elevated on-off light was constructed to mimic the Pharos lighthouse. To save time and material, this fake
Meanwhile, the real
According to Fisher's account, on the first night “hundreds of bombs peppered Maskelyne’s sandy ‘stage’.” Eight days in succession German bombers came at night and bombed the wrong harbour. Then all was quiet. The Luftwaffe had been ordered to concentrate on Operation Barbarossa, the secret invasion of
The ‘
Or was it? How effective was this stratagem? Where indeed was the decoy site located? How long was it maintained? Why does no-one else mention it? Why are there no surviving photos or blueprints? Did it even take place?
Certain critical points need to be raised:
Firstly, Michael Haag, an expert on
But Maryut is an inland salt-water lake not a bay or a shoreline. This is an important observation, overlooked by all previous writers.
Secondly, Fisher claimed that “nothing of the magnitude proposed by Maskelyne had ever been considered." This assertion is wrong. Fisher fails to mention that special night-time decoys, known as Starfish sites, were being developed around important British industrial centres in late 1940 and early 1941. (The codename Starfish is derived from the letters SF which originally referred to Special Fires.) As in
“By the end of December(1940) eighteen Starfish were operational.
From December 1940 new Starfish continued to open at a rate averaging almost one site daily until June(1941) , when the end of the Blitz brought a hiatus in construction.”
Dobinson documents how starfish installations thwarted German raids against
These decoy sites clearly predate Maskelyne's
It is quite possible that as starfish sites blossomed in the
VANISHING THE
According to Fisher's account, after the success of the Alexandrian experiment, Major Barkas had further important work for the Magic Gang. He asked if Maskelyne could camouflage the
The answer, of course, was yes. But how could this impossible challenge be met?
The Canal was 107 miles long.
Undaunted, the Magic Gang, according to Fisher, sat down and brainstormed possible solutions to this immense task. As with the Alexandrian challenge, they began by considering the more obvious solutions. To begin with, why not cover the whole canal with canvas? This would be impractical, expensive,and time consuming.
Then, why not construct mirrors to create an immense visual illusion, deflecting the position of the real canal? This seemed at first like a promising approach but was rejected when Maskelyne realised that it would require too many mirrors.
Instead, Maskelyne came up with the unorthodox idea of constructing 21 'dazzle lights' along the length of the Canal. These powerful searchlights , containing 24 different spinning beams, projected a swirling, cartwheeling confusion of light up to nine miles into the sky. A barrage of light to confuse and blind the enemy bombers, which Maskelyne dubbed Whirling Spray.
Fisher claims that this radical defensive shield of light was highly effective and was a major reason why the
According to Fisher, Maskelyne's dazzle lights were later employed successfully in
If only these extraordinary and outlandish claims were true...
The description of Maskelyne’s near fatal test flight above the deathly dazzle light reads like B-movie melodrama. Fisher obviously based his account on the dubious incident written up in Magic:Top-Secret , which has all the hallmarks of the invisible ghostwriter.
Let us extract ourselves from the world of make-believe and consider the evidence more seriously.
When I first read "The War Magician", I wondered how effective the dazzle lights really were. Several questions came to mind. Why did the Germans fail to close down the
Was the
Further research was needed, but useful material was hard to find. This whole topic has been curiously neglected by historians. Even books specialising in the Mediterranean war gave only brief coverage to the
Fortunately, I came across an excellent article, "Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy 1919-1941" by historian Steven Morewood which gave answers to my questions.
The following information is based on his valuable research:
Raids by Italian bombers in the latter half of 1940 were sporadic, ineffective and inaccurate.
The Luftwaffe made its first bombing attack on
Later that month, magnetic mines were introduced, closing the Canal for the early part of February.
And in March 1941 the Germans succeeded in sinking minesweepers.
Churchill warned his generals that the
In addition ,200 observation posts were set up along the Canal.
The Germans were to employ three types of mines : "acoustic, magnetic, delayed action".
As the raids became more threatening, greater efforts were made by the British to improve the defences. According to Morewood, "The mine sweeping organisation was improved, further AA guns installed, a gun zone established between
The important thing to note is that the British were constantly taking effective defensive measures in reaction to the German threat. Each time the Luftwaffe changed tactics, the Canal defences were altered and tightened.
For example, in May 1941 : "Compelled by barrage balloons and more intense AA fire to abandon low level sorties, its (the Luftwaffe's) attacks were dispersed over a wider area than hitherto and mine laying was accompanied by the bombing and machine gunning of defence positions..."
In July 1941 : "...the Germans tried yet another tactic, making concentrated attacks with more aircraft upon the canal's harbour installations and ships at anchor."
Meantime, the British , far from being passive, had installed more sophisticated warning radar.
In addition, German radio messages were being successfully decoded which revealed the strategic deployment of enemy aircraft in the
In August and September 1941, German raids continued, but the British responded by bringing in an anti-aircraft cruiser and more fighter aircraft.
In October 1941, a tanker was "sunk by a mine believed to have been laid as far back as 12 July."
As a consequence, the British introduced "more intensive mine sweeping from early November."
There were four failed enemy air raids in the first ten days of November. "Thereafter, there were no further serious incidents."
"By 1942